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THE ARGUMENT AGAINST A PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO WARN
FOR GENETIC DISEASES: THE CONFLICTS CREATED
BY SAFER V. ESTATE OF PACK'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Superior Court of New Jersey, in Safer v. Estate of Pack, held
that a physician has a duty to warn individuals known to be at risk of
avoidable harm from a genetically transmissible condition.2 The Su-
perior Court stated that there was no essential difference between ge-
netic diseases and other contagious or infectious diseases and,
therefore, imposed a duty on physicians to warn a patient's family
members at risk of contracting a genetic disease.3 The court avoided
addressing whether it is practical for a physician to warn a patient's
family members and whether there is an unrealistic burden on physi-
cians forced to warn a patient's family members, particularly with re-
spect to young children at risk, as was the case in Safer.4 In concluding
that a physician has a duty to warn for genetic diseases, the Superior
Court of New Jersey has created serious implications for a patient's
privacy rights, patient-physician confidentiality, as well as a patient's
health and safety.
II. THE CASE
In the 1950s and 1960s, Robert Batkin, father of Donna Safer, was
a patient of Dr. George Pack, a specialist in treating and removing
cancerous tumors.5 In 1964, Mr. Batkin died when Donna Safer was
ten years old.6 In 1969, Dr. Pack died.7 More than twenty years later,
in 1990, Mrs. Safer was diagnosed with a cancerous blockage of the
colon and polyposis. s She underwent numerous surgeries and chem-
otherapy to treat the cancer. ' The next year, Mrs. Safer learned her
1. 677 A.2d 1188 (NJ. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1996), cert. denied, 683 A.2d 1163 (N.J. 1996).
2. See id. at 1192-93.
3. See id.; see also infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
4. See id. at 1192.
5. See id. at 1190.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. Polyposis is a hereditary condition marked by multiple polyps lining the
intestines, especially the colon, and it has a high potential for malignancy. See Miller-
Keane's Encyclopedia & Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing, & Allied Health 1189 (5th ed.
1992) [hereinafter MILLER-KEANE'S ENCYCLOPEDIA].
9. See Safer, 677 A.2d at 1190.
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father had polyposis, a hereditary condition that leads to metastatic
colorectal cancer if left untreated.1 ° Mrs. Safer and her husband sued
Dr. Pack's estate alleging Dr. Pack knew of the hereditary nature of
the disease yet negligently failed to warn her of the risk of contracting
the genetic disease.1'
The trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence regarding
whether or not Dr. Pack had warned Mrs. Safer's father about the
hereditability of the disease. 12 Having none of Dr. Pack's medical
records, the trial court relied on the testimony of medical experts of
both parties and Mrs. Safer's mother's testimony. 13 According to the
trial court, Dr. Pack had no duty to Mrs. Safer because a physician has
a duty to warn in only two situations: when there is a physician-patient
relationship or when there are circumstances requiring the protection
of the public's health. 4
In this case, Mrs. Safer was not a patient of Dr. Pack.' 5 The court
held that Dr. Pack's duty to warn extended only to his patient, Mrs.
Safer's father.1 6 As for protecting the public health, the trial court
acknowledged that contagious or infectious diseases, which may be
easily spread between persons, warrant public health protection.'
However, the trial court believed genetic diseases to be threats which
are already present in an individual, do not spread between individu-
als, and, thus, do not rise to the public health level of contagious or
infectious diseases.18
On appeal, the Superior Court held that there is
[N]o impediment . . . to recognizing a physician's duty to
warn those known to be at risk of avoidable harm from a
genetically transmissible condition .... [T] here is no essen-
tial difference between the type of genetic threat at issue
here and the menace of infection, contagion or a threat of
physical harm.19
10. See id. For a detailed explanation of metastatic cancer, see THE MERCK MANUAL at
1211-12 (15th ed. 1987).
11. See Safer, 677 A.2d at 1190.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Safer, 677 A.2d 1190.
18. See id. at 1190-91. The trial court relied on Pate v. Threlkel which held that a physi-
cian did not owe a duty to warn a patient's child of the threat of a genetic disease. 661
So.2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995). The trial court stated that Pate was the only case on point
regarding genetically transmissible diseases. See Safer, 677 A.2d at 1191.
19. See Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192.
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The Superior Court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the
complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with their above holding.2"
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Courts have held physicians and psychiatrists liable for failing to
warn patients and third parties. For example, in 1976, the Supreme
Court of California held that a therapist had a duty to warn third par-
ties known to be at risk of immediate danger in Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California.2 And, in NewJersey, even before Safer, the
Superior Court of New Jersey followed Tarasoffs non-binding prece-
dent and applied the same duty to warn in McIntosh v. Milano.22
In malpractice cases, courts have consistently held that physicians
have a duty to third parties for injuries inflicted as a result of the phy-
sician's failure to properly diagnose a contagious disease.23 For in-
stance, in 1959, in Wojcik v. Aluminum Company of America,2 4 an
employer, who had tuberculosis subjected his employees to chest X-
rays.25 The physician who performed the X-rays failed to inform the
employees if they had developed tuberculosis.26 The Supreme Court
of New York held the physician liable to an employee's wife who con-
tracted the disease. 27 In 1974, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Fosgate v. Corona,28 held a physician liable to a patient's husband and
20. See id.
21. 551 P.2d 334, 340-53 (Cal. 1976) (holding psychologist liable because he was aware
of his own patient's intent to kill plaintiffs' daughter, Tatiana Tarasoff, but did not detain
the patient, nor warn Ms. Tarasoff of the patient's intent to kill her).
22. 403 A.2d 500, 503 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (applying the duty established in
Tarasoffeven though it "is nonbinding authority in this jurisdiction . . .").
23. See., e.g., Tracy A. Bateman, Liability of Doctor or Other Health Practitioner to Third Party
Contracting Contagious Disease from Doctor's Patient, 3 A.L.R. 5th 370, passim (1993) (discuss-
ing the liability of physicians for failing to diagnose contagious diseases and subsequently
failing to inform third parties of the contagious nature of the disease); see also Sonia M.
Suter, Whose Genes Are These Anyway? Familial Conflicts Over Access to Genetic Information, 91
MICH. L. REv. 1854, 1874 n.121 (1993).
24. 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959).
25. See id. at 353.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 357-58. The court held:
It is the duty of a physician who is attending a patient afflicted with a contagious or
infectious disease to exercise care in advising and warning members of the family
and others who are liable to exposure of the existence and nature of the danger
from the disease, to avoid doing any act which would tend to spread the infection,
and to take all necessary precautionary measures to prevent its spread to other
patients attended. A physician who fails to give such a warning is negligent ....
Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
28. 330 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1974).
1998] 439
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & POLICY
children who later contracted tuberculosis when the physician failed
to diagnose and treat the patient's tuberculosis.29 In 1990, in Britton v
Soltes, o the Appellate Court of Illinois held a physician liable when
his negligence in diagnosing tuberculosis resulted in a third party con-
tracting the disease. 1 In 1995, in Reisner v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia,32 a physician never told his patient she received a blood
transfusion contaminated with the human immunodeficiency virus
(HV) . The California appellate court held the physician liable to
the patient's boyfriend, who contracted HIV from the patient.34 And
in 1996, in Garcia v. Santa Rosa Health Care Corporation,35 a health care
provider never told a patient he may have been infected with HIV
from a blood transfusion. The Court. of Appeals of Texas held the
physician liable to the patient's wife.36
- These cases demonstrate that a health care provider may be held
liable for a third party's injuries when the provider is somehow re-
sponsible for the initial injury to the patient. Although the cases indi-
cate that many jurisdictions have adopted a duty to warn, there is little
authority regarding the liability of physicians for failure to warn third
parties at risk of genetically transmissible disease.37 In Safer, not only did
the trial court and Superior Court rely on cases from other states, but
also, those same cases had nothing to do with genetics.38 The only
New Jersey case the Superior Court cited regarding genetic disclosure
dated back to 1981, Schroeder v. Perkel.39 In Schroeder, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that physicians may have a duty to warn a
patient's immediate family members who may be at risk of contracting
a genetic disease.4 ° In this case, the physician failed to diagnose a
29. See id. at 359.
30. 563 N.E.2d 910 (111. App. Ct. 1990).
31. See id. at 912 (holding that "a duty will be extended only where the relationship
between the patient and the third party is such that negligence to the patient necessarily
results in injury to the third party").
32. 31 Cal. App. 4th 1195 (1995).
33. See id. at 1197.
34. See id.
35. 925 S.W.2d 372 (Tx. Ct. App. 1996).
36. See id. at 375.
37. SeeSaferv. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188,1191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), cert.
denied, 683 A.2d 1163 (1996).
38. See id. at 1191-93 (citing the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Pate and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Couri's decision in Tarasof]). Neither of the NewJersey cases cited by the
Superior Court involved disclosure for genetic diseases. See id.; see also Fosgate v. Corona,
330 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1974) (medical malpractice case regarding the diagnosis and treatment
of tuberculosis); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (wrong-
ful death action about a psychiatrist's duty to warn).
39. 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).
40. See id. at 835-36.
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four-year-old child with cystic fibrosis." Because the child was not
properly diagnosed, the parents gave birth to another child who also
suffered from cystic fibrosis.42 The Supreme Court held that the phy-
sician had, not only a duty to correctly diagnose the four-year-old
child, but also an independent duty to the patient's parents to disclose
to them that the child suffered from cystic fibrosis.43
Fourteen years later, in Pate v. Threlkel,44 the Supreme Court of
Florida held that a physician's duty to warn the children of a patient
with a hereditary genetic disease was satisfied by simply warning the
patient.45 The plaintiff in Pate was diagnosed with medullary thyroid
carcinoma, a genetically transferable disease that can be prevented
and most often curable.4 6 Although the court concluded that a rea-
sonably prudent health care provider has a duty to warn family mem-
bers at risk of a genetically transferable condition, because of
confidentiality concerns and practicality, the court stated: "in any cir-
cumstances in which the physician has a duty to warn of a genetically
transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning the patient"
who can ordinarily be expected to pass on the warning.4 7 The Safer
court rejected Pate by stating that there may be some circumstances in
which the duty to warn will not be satisfied by informing the patient
alone.4 8
IV. ANALYSIS
Although not exactly similar,49 there are many comparable quali-
ties between HIV-related and genetic information. ° Both circum-
41. See id. Cystic fibrosis is a "generalized hereditary disorder associated with wide-
spread dysfunction of the exocrine glands, with accumulation of excessively think and ten-
uous mucus and abnormal secretion of sweat and saliva," and may eventually cause chronic
obstructive lung disease. MILLER-KEANE'S ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 8, at 380-81.
42. See Schroeder, 432 A.2d at 835-36.
43. See id. at 839.
44. 661 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1995).
45. See id. at 282. Because the court did not define "warning," it is unclear whether a
letter, a phone call, or a conversation constitutes proper warning. See id.
46. See id. at 279.
47. Id. at 282.
48. See Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192-93 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996),
cert. denied, 683 A.2d 1163 (1996).
49. See Paul A. Lombardo, Genetic Confidentiality: What's the Big Secret?, 3 U. CHI. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 589, 593 (1996) (stating that the need to protect confidentiality of HIV infor-
mation is not comparable to genetic information because most genetic diseases "do not
elicit stigma, fear, or discomfort evoked by an inevitably deadly disease linked to socially
marginal populations. .. ").
50. See Brian R. Gin, Genetic Discrimination: Huntington's Disease and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1406 (1997) (comparing Huntington's disease and HIV
1998]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
stances involve highly personal and sensitive information; both may be
indicative of a person's future; and both may lead to negative conse-
quences as a result of disclosure, such as discrimination. 1 Because of
these concerns, state and federal legislatures have attempted to regu-
late procedures for obtaining or disclosing information regarding
HIV as well as genetics.5" Generally, all state and federal statutes em-
phasize the importance of informed consent before any disclosure.5"
Given the similarities between genetics and HIV testing, and the
dearth of precedent regarding disclosure of genetic testing results, the
remainder of this article analyzes information regarding disclosure for
HIV testing and relates it to disclosure of genetic testing results. Sec-
tion A analyzes the potential benefits commonly cited to support a
duty to warn for genetic diseases. These presumed benefits include
early detection and treatment, knowledge, and disease prevention.
Section B analyzes possible negative consequences of mandated dis-
closure to third parties, such as employment and insurance discrimi-
nation, and potential domestic violence.
A. The Benefits and Detriments of Genetic Testing and Disclosure
1. Early Detection and Treatment
One suggested benefit of warning an individual who may be at
risk of developing a genetic disease is the hope that they will seek early
monitoring and, if necessary, early treatment. If physicians have a
duty to warn family members of patients at risk of contracting genetic
diseases, it should be in the narrow circumstance where the disease is
treatable. The Safer court's imposed duty to warn can and should be
infection); see also Wendy E. Parmet, Legislating Privacy: The HIV Experience, 23 J.L. MED. &
ETHics, No. 4 at 371 (1995); Ilise Levy Feitshans, Foreshadowing Future Changes: Implications
of the AIDS Pandemic for International Law and Policy of Public Health, 15 MicH. J. IN-r'L L. 807
(1994). Feitshans states:
The new approach developed in response to AIDS may have implications for
other areas of public health where the results of a blood test bear great emotional
freight, such as genetics. For example, in the Institute of Medicine Report,...
the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine describes a possible fu-
ture form of prenatal diagnosis, where a mother's blood may be drawn to reveal
the genetic composition of fetal cells found in maternal serum. Such blood tests
could reveal information about inherited disease in a given fetus, which may be as
emotionally charged as an HLV test result.
Feitshans, supra at 815-16 (citation omitted).
51. See Parmet, supra note 50, at 373.
52. See id. at 371; see also infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
53. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 997; see also Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, the
Genetic "Quick Fix," and the Jewish Community, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 106 (1997).
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read this narrowly. 54 The Safer court imposed a "duty to warn those
known to be at risk of avoidable harm from a genetically transmissible
condition. 55 The court also recognized the importance of early treat-
ment by criticizing the lower court for not recognizing the signifi-
cance of early monitoring and early treatment.
56
Notifying an individual who may be at risk for a genetic disease or
HIV infection may prompt the person to seek preventive care, early
monitoring, and early treatment. However, some commentators have
suggested that there is no real benefit to genetic testing for some peo-
ple because the vast majority of detectable genetic diseases are incur-
able.5 7 Some commentators argue that genetic testing only leads to
worry.58 Upon receiving a test result indicating the presence of a ge-
netic disorder or "disease gene," carriers may often experience confu-
sion, alienation, and depression after being tested. " They may feel
that their relatives blame them for imposing a genetic risk on them.6"
Some people feel "survivor's guilt."'" Parents who have passed the dis-
ease gene causing their child to have a genetic disorder may suffer
54. See Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1191-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996),
cert. denied, 683 A.2d 1163 (1996) (implying there are various types of genetic disease in-
cluding those that are treatable and those that are not); see also Ellen Wright Clayton,
Screening and Treatment of Newborns, 29 Hous. L. REv. 85, 109 (1992) (discussing the signifi-
cant difference between a diagnosis of a newborn for which there is effective treatment
compared to when the diagnosis can only be used to prepare the parents for the imminent
deterioration in their child's health).
55. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192 (emphasis added).
56. See id. (concluding that the trial court's characterization of this case as one involv-
ing an "unavoidable genetic condition" gave too little significance to the fact that early
monitoring of patients at risk could avert some of the more serious consequences that a
patient with multiple polyposis might otherwise experience).
57. See Alexandra K. Glazier, Genetic Predispositions, Prophylactic Treatments and Private
Health Insurance: Nothing is Better Than a Good Pair of Genes, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 68 n.1
(1997) (suggesting that early detection for breast cancers may only give individuals a
greater number of years of knowing that they are sick but does not necessarily extend their
lives); see also Suter, supra note 23, at 1900.
58. See Suter, supra note 23, at 1893.
59. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 975; Richard A. Bornstein, Genetic Discrimination,
Insurability and Legislation: A Closing of the Legal Loopholes, 4J.L. & POL'y 551, 574-75 (1996).
Carriers, in particular pregnant women, experience much anxiety, and may feel "defective"
or that they have "failed" society because they will probably not produce healthy children.
Andrews, supra note 41, at 976 n.37.
60. See Suter, supra note 23, at 1880.
61. Andrews, supra note 41, at 977. Andrews compares this type of survivor's guilt with
"soldiers whose buddies have died in war .. " Id. Like soldiers who have survived by
chance, individuals who have not inherited the diseased gene wonder why they have been
spared when other family members have inherited the gene and contracted the disease.
See id.
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emotional stress "because their psychological well-being is affected
and they cannot blame an external cause to alleviate their guilt. 6 2
2. Knowledge of Carrying a Disease Gene
When there is no available treatment or when treatment does not
completely eliminate the risk of disease, knowledge is often assumed
to benefit individuals psychologically. However, this assumption is not
true for all individuals. Therefore, courts should recognize the right
not to know.6" For example, one study has shown that less than fifty
percent of people with a family history of breast or ovarian cancer
wanted to know if they carried a gene linked to the disease.64
Similarly, many individuals choose not to know whether they
carry the gene for Huntington's disease, a disease that has no cure
and will ultimately cause death.65 In fact, it may be unethical for a
physician to force knowledge of an incurable disease on a person,66
because the suicide rate among people who know they may contract
Huntington's disease is four times higher than the general popula-
tion.67 Despite the increased chance of suicide, fifty-eight percent of
geneticists said they would disclose the risk of Huntington's disease to
a relative without the patient's consent regardless of the fact that it is
untreatable.68 It appears that these geneticists have decided for
others that it is better to know than not to know.
For many people, knowledge of a genetic disorder affects notions
of identity. 69 In fact, the term "shattered self-adequacy syndrome" has
62. Clayton, supra note 54, at 112.
63. See Suter, supra note 23, at 1893. "Genetic testing is often intimately connected
with personal reproductive decisions, and thus no one should decide which choice is best
for another." Id.; see Marleen Temmerman et al., The Right Not to Know HIV Test Results, 345
LANCET 969 (1995) (arguing for the right of HIV-infected women to not obtain test results
due to retaliatory violence).
64. See Richard H. Underwood & Ronald G. Cadle, Genetics, Genetic Testing, and the Spec-
ter of Discrimination: A Discussion Using Hypothetical Cases, 85 Ky. L.J. 665, 681 n.63 (1996-97).
65. See id. Huntington's disease causes degeneration of the nervous system and does
not usually appear until a person is in his or her late forties. See Andrews, supra note 41, at
969 n.7 & 976.
66. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 976; see also Lindsay A. Farrer, Suicide and Attempted
Suicide in Huntington's Disease: Implications for Preclinical Testing of Persons at Risk, 24 AM. J.
MED. GENETICS 305, 305 (1986).
67. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 976.
68. See id. at 989.
69. See Regina H. Kenen, Stigmatization of Carrier Status: Social Implications of Heterozygote
Genetic Screening Programs, 68 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1116, 1117 (1978); see also Suter, supra
note 23, at 1860. "Knowledge of genetic predisposition for a disease, verification of carrier
status, or antenatal diagnosis of a genetic disorder may create feelings of inadequacy or
strangeness that are themselves damaging to health." Kenen, supra at 1117.
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been devised to describe the chronic stress that the diagnosis of a ge-
netic disorder creates.7" Specifically for women, it was found that
"[d] ecisions to undergo genetic testing -and control or lack of con-
trol over dissemination of the results of such testing- affect a wo-
man's self-image, her personal relationships, and how she is regarded
by institutions such as insurers and employers."'"
3. Disease Prevention
Another often cited benefit of notifying a person carrying a dis-
ease gene that they may develop a genetic disease is so they may make
"responsible" reproductive decisions.72 The notion is that better in-
formation allows individuals to better plan for their future.7" For in-
stance, if Dr. Pack had warned Mrs. Safer that she may have inherited
a genetic disease from her father, her procreative decisions may have
been affected.
Arguably, the very purpose of prenatal genetic screening is to
"permit pregnant women to abort fetuses with genetic anomalies. 74
However, upon notification of a genetic defect in her fetus, a preg-
nant woman may feel stigmatization 71 or social and economic pres-
70. See D. Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil A Blueprint for Legislative
Reform of the Disclosure of Health-Related Information in Adoption, 70 N.C. L. REv. 681, 697
(1992).
71. Andrews, supra note 41, at 967.
72. See generally Elena A. Gates, Prenatal Genetic Testing. Does It Benefit Pregnant Women?,
in WOMEN & PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 183
(Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994).
73. See Rothenberg, supra note 53, at 106.
74. Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 103, 112 (1996) (citing early attempts by laboratories to make amniocentesis
availability contingent on the agreement to abort if an anomaly was detected).
75. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 979. Health care providers conducted a study of
sickle cell anemia in a small farming village in Greece. See id. Sickle cell anemia is a blood
disorder primarily affecting African Americans and causes severe anemia as red blood cells
are destroyed by abnormal "sickling" of the hemoglobin protein. The researchers thought
that sickle cell anemia testing would decrease the number of affected children. See id.; see
also CatherineJ. Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease Through Law, 15 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 801,
824 (1982); Kenen, supra note 69, at 1117; George Stamatoyannopoulos, Problems of Screen-
ing and Counseling in the Hemoglobinopathies, in BIRTH DEFECTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 268, 272 (Arno G. Motulsky & Widukind Lenz eds., 1974).
Instead, the birth rate of affected children did not decrease. See Andrews, supra note 41, at
979. The researchers explained that the birth rate stability was due to stigmatization. See
id. In some instances, a carrier of the sickle cell trait would only marry another carrier. See
id. Similar studies conducted in the United States seem to indicate that such stigmatization
may not develop as strongly in American society. See Kenen, supra note 69, at 1117 (com-
paring the results of the study conducted in Greece with the results of a Tay-Sachs screen-
ing program in Baltimore, Maryland and Washington, D.C. and attributing some of the
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 1:437
sure to abort the affected fetus.7 6 In The Genetic Revolution, Daniel
Callahan states:
It takes a tough and determined woman these days not to
exercise the "free choice" of choosing prenatal diagnosis,
and a still tougher and more determined woman not to have
an abortion if a serious defect is discovered in her fetus.
Here as elsewhere, social pressure can accomplish quite
nicely what could never be legislated.77
The pressure to abort affected fetuses may come from health insur-
ance companies as well.78 Even genetic counselors and other health
care providers who counsel using non-directive counseling techniques
differences to the fact that the studies in the United States were conducted in urban set-
tings whereas the sickle cell study in Greece was conducted in a rural community).
76. See Barbara Katz Rothman, Women Feel Social and Economic Pressures to Abort Abnormal
Fetuses, 17 BIRTH 81, 81 (1990). Rothman states:
The pressures here tend to be economic: by providing little -and ever less-
support to families and to people with disabilities, women are made to feel little
choice but to abort fetuses .... The pressures are also social: women are increas-
ingly held responsible ... for the health of their children .... The women I
interviewed who were making decisions about using prenatal diagnosis . . .felt
enormous pressure toward using all available technology to detect "defects" in
their fetuses ....
Id. Oliver Wendell Holmes' infamous remark that "three generations of imbeciles are
enough" also shows the judicial system's justification of involuntary sterilization in order to
"prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." Buck v. Bel4 274 U.S.
200, 207 (1927).
77. Daniel Callahan, The Genetic Revolution, 66 N.Y. ST. BJ. 30, 31 (1994) (citation omit-
ted). Callahan also states:
New medical technologies rarely remain discretionary for long. If they are not
legally imposed on people, something hard to do in our society, they can just as
effectively be imposed by social pressure. When prenatal diagnosis was being in-
troduced in the late 1960s, every assurance was given that no woman would be
forced to have such a diagnosis, much less be forced into an abortion if the diag-
nosis turned up a terrible genetic defect. The worry about coercion was mis-
placed. Social pressure and developing mores on prenatal diagnosis soon turned
it into a routine procedure, as common and standard as taking blood pressure for
women over the age of 35.
Id.
78. See Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination As a Consequence of Genetic Testing, in CON-
TEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHics 637, 64142 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 4th
ed. 1994) (discussing the threat of losing health insurance pressures women to abort af-
fected fetuses); see also Underwood & Cadle, supra note 64, at 687 (stating that there ap-
pear to have been cases of insurance companies expressing their preference that affected
fetuses be aborted); Susan L. Waysdorf, Families in the AIDS Crisis: Access, Quality, Empower-
ment, and the Role of Kinship Caregivers, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 145, 179 (1994) (discussing the
pressure pregnant women with AIDS often receive, including the threat of insurance bene-
fits being terminated if they choose to give birth).
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may inadvertently pressure pregnant women to abort affected
fetuses.79
In Atakpa v. Perimeter Ob-Gyn Associates,80 a pregnant woman's pre-
natal care provider terminated her care when she refused to take an
HIV test."1 During the physician's testimony, he also admitted to dis-
charging patients for not undergoing genetic testing. 2 He stated, "I
have discharged other patients from my care for refusing to comply
with diagnostic testing. For instance, I discharged a patient in 1992
who refused to undergo fetal monitoring for her pregnancy which was
complicated by hypertension.""3 Despite this testimony, the Atakpa
court dismissed the case stating that the plaintiff lacked standing be-
cause she did not allege that she will ever seek services from the de-
fendant health care provider in the future.8 4
After Atakpa, it appears that a pregnant woman seeking prenatal
care must submit to genetic and/or HIV testing or find another pro-
79. See Andrews, supra note 41 at 981 (discussing the pressure by physicians to abort
affected fetuses and the dilemma a woman may feel that she will be judged too harshly by
others for aborting); see also Angus Clarke, Is Non-Directive Genetic Counseling Possible?, 338
LANCET 998, 998 (1991); Shepherd, supra note 74, at 112-13 (citing interviews conducted
by Barbara Katz Rothman that revealed genetic counselors' biases regarding abortion de-
pending on the severity of the perceived genetic anomaly).
80. 912 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
81. See id. at 1575. The court concluded the plaintiff was denied treatment even
though the health care provider attempted to argue that the patient voluntarily left. See id.
Even though the HIV test is "voluntary," it is unclear how many prenatal care providers
have denied pregnant women prenatal care for asserting their right not to take an HIV
test. It has been documented that some prenatal care providers test patients for HIV with-
out any discussion, leaving some patients unsure of whether they had in fact been tested
for HIV. See Gail Kennedy & Bethany Young, The Alameda County Prenatal HIV Testing
Demonstration Project: Final Evaluation Report 18-19 (Jan. 1997) (unpublished report, on
file with the California Department of Health Services, Office of AIDS).
82. See Atakpa, 912 F. Supp. at 1574.
83. Id. There are numerous types of fetal monitoring including amniocentesis, fetal
blood sampling, chorionic villi sampling, and fetal cell sorting. See Andrews, supra note 41,
at 968. The most common technique used in prenatal diagnosis is amniocentesis in which
a long needle penetrates the abdominal and uterine wall to draw amniotic fluid for diag-
nostic testing. SeeJanet A. Kobrin, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1283, 1290 (1983). Amniocentesis causes spontaneous abortion in approximately one or
two per thousand pregnancies and involves a physical risk to the pregnant woman, particu-
larly risks of infection. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 968. Fetal blood sampling, which
involves sampling blood from the fetus while in utero, is associated with a 3% to 6% risk of
fetal death. See id. Chorionic villi sampling, which involves sampling the fetus' tissue be-
tween eight and twelve weeks gestation, is associated with a 2% to 5% spontaneous abor-
tion rate, shortened or missing limbs, fingers, and toes, and tongue and jaw malformations.
See id. at 968 n.4; see also John A. Robertson, Book Note: The Invisible Women, 108 HARv. L.
REv. 953, 958 n.14 (1995). Fetal cell sorting, which involves a simple blood test on the
pregnant woman, does not create a physical risk to either the fetus or the pregnant wo-
man. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 970.
84. See Atakpa, 912 F. Supp. at 1574.
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vider who will respect her refusal to submit to voluntary testing. If she
submits to testing and it is determined that she carries a disease gene,
under Safer, her physician has a duty to warn family members known
to be at risk. 5 Each scenario presents significant concerns that may
ultimately deter women from seeking prenatal care.
8 6
B. The Consequences of Imposing a Duty to Warn
1. Employment and Insurance Discrimination May Result from Disclosure
Information obtained from genetic testing may result in employ-
ment and insurance discrimination. 7 The Council for Responsible
Genetics, a national bioethics advocacy organization, has documented
more than two hundred cases where healthy people were denied
health insurance or employment because of their genetic makeup. 8
In a survey of people having a known genetic condition in their fam-
ily, "22% indicated that they had been refused health insurance cover-
age because of their genetic status, whether they were sick or not. "89
85. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
86. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 984-85. At the very least, Atakpa and Safer may de-
crease testing rates. See Suter, supra note 23, at 1880. Using HIV as a comparison, "experi-
ence.., shows.., when HIV testing is perceived to be forced on an individual, or when
testing is done without the proper consent, people react negatively due to the stigma asso-
ciated with HIV, concern about how the test results will be used, [and] lack of understand-
ing about the meaning of the test results .... " John M. Naber & David R. Johnson,
Mandatory HIV Testing Issues in State Newborn Screening Programs, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 55, 66
(1993).
87. See Feitshans, supra note 50, at 820; see generally Bornstein, supra note 59; Glazier,
supra note 57. In assessing health and social policy, Feitshans states:
[E]mployment and insurance discrimination against people with genetic disabili-
ties may affect the insurability and health status of families and dependents in
much the same manner that early AIDS case law reflected a concern for family
members with AIDS. Not only the concerns for discrimination issues, but also the
mechanisms for framing the issues clearly follow the emerging AIDS para-
digm .... Similar issues regarding privacy, confidentiality, mandatory testing,
and protection against discrimination in insurance and employment have been
raised in the context of genetic discoveries in the wake of the human genome
project .... In the case of genetic diseases, mandatory testing has been criticized
as a potential tool for eugenics by enabling the State to filter out undesirable
genetic traits through obligatory testing. These critics clearly rely on the AIDS
precedent for their view that informed consent, as a part of pretest and posttest
counseling, should be required for all genetic testing.
Feitshans, supra note 50, at 820-21; see also generally LoRi B. ANDREws, ASSESSING GENETIC
RisKs: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
88. See Julie Forster, New Jersey: Bill that Bans Genetic Discrimination on Governor's Desk,
June 25, 1996, available in WEST'S LEGAL NEWS 6019 (citing state legislation regarding ge-
netic information).
89, See Kathy L. Hudson et al., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Need
forReform, 270 SCIENCE 391, 391 (1995) (citing E.V. Lapham &J.O. Weiss, The Alliance of
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Health insurance companies can lawfully exclude people based
upon pre-existing conditions, and the insurers use genetic testing as
"an enormous loophole" to do it.0 For example, a pregnant woman
was diagnosed as a carrier for cystic fibrosis, and her health mainte-
nance organization informed her that it would not pay for the health
care costs of the child if she chose not to abort.91 Similarly, a health
insurer told a woman whose mother had breast cancer that it would
not cover the cost of any treatment if she developed breast cancer.92
Likewise, an insurer denied benefits to a healthy eight-year-old child,
successfully diagnosed and treated for phenylketonuria (PKU)93 as a
newborn, when her father changed jobs.94
Another example of both employment and insurance discrimina-
tion occurred in the 1970s when states mandated testing African
Americans for sickle cell anemia.95 Airlines grounded African Ameri-
can employees because of unfounded fears that a sickling crisis might
occur if a plane depressurized.96 Others were encouraged to undergo
sterilization.9 7 In addition, insurance companies charged higher pre-
miums to sickle cell carriers even though there was no data support-
ing such an increase. 98
Due to serious insurance discrimination, some states have passed
statutes forbidding the denial of health insurance for carriers of sickle
cell anemia or Tay-Sachs disease.99 Federal statutes are also beginning
Genetic Support Groups, Human Genome Model Project, preliminary results of a survey of
persons with a genetic disorder in the family).
90. Andrews, supra note 41, at 986; see Underwood & Cadle, supra note 64, at 665 n.21;
see alsoJill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What's Fair?, 80 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1646, 1668 (1995).
91. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 985-86.
92. See id. at 986.
93. PKU is caused by the absence of an enzyme which usually leads to severe mental
retardation. See DORL.A-'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1278 (28th ed. 1994); see also Damme,
supra note 75, at 821. PKU is cured with a special diet low in phenylalanine. See Damme,
supra note 75, at 821. Because the test consists of drawing a small amount of a newborn's
blood and the disease is curable, there has been very little opposition to PKU statutes that
require the screening of newborns. See id. at 821-23.
94. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 986.
95. See id. at 978 & 987; see also Kobrin, supra note 83, at 1292. Similar problems arose
in the 1960s when states mandated the screening of newborns for PKU. See Suter, supra
note 23, at 1908 n.6.
96. See Kobrin, supra note 83, at 1292 n.60; see also P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL
POLICY 154 (1977).
97. See Lombardo, supra note 49, at 596-97.
98. See id.
99. See Underwood & Cadle, supra note 64, at 686 n.84 (citing Alabama and Maryland
statutes). Tay-Sachs is a disorder of the nervous system that affects mostly Eastern Euro-
pean Jews that usually leads to death by age three. Andrews, supra note 41, at 969 n.10.
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to address genetic discrimination.1"' The Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act of 199611 is the first federal law addressing
genetic discrimination. 1 2 The Act prohibits insurers and employers
from denying health insurance based upon genetic information.0 3
However, the Act does not cover life or disability insurance and does
not prevent insurance companies from charging higher premiums or
from limiting coverage based upon genetic information. 0 4 "It also
does not require insurers to obtain authorization before disclosing ge-
netic information. 10 5 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 10 6
prohibits employers from refusing to hire someone based upon ge-
netic information."0 7 However, the ADA allows employers to order
genetic testing of potential employees without their permission, as
long as the information is not used in some type of unfair or unjust
fashion.'0 8
2. Domestic Violence May Result from Disclosure
In addition to various discrimination that may result from disclo-
sure of genetic information, the widespread problem of domestic vio-
100. See Lombardo, supra note 49, 601-12; see also generally Bornstein, supra note 59
(describing recent federal and state legislation addressing genetic discrimination); Burk
Burnett, Genetic Discrimination: Legislation Required to Keep Genetic Secrets, 21 SETON HALL
LEGIS.J. 502 (1997).
101. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 104 Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 701, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
102. See Kyle G. French, The Elderly and the Discriminatory Use of Genetic Information, 5
ELDER L.J. 147, 168 (1997).
103. See id.
104. See id. Commentators have argued that the fundamental structure of the life insur-
ance industry would be jeopardized if genetic information could not be used to classify
risks. See RobertJ. Pokorski, Commentary: Genetic Information and Life Insurance, 376 NATURE
13, 14 (1995). The argument is that because life insurance premiums are based on relative
mortality risk, not using genetic information would increase prices, disproportionately af-
fecting lower income families and creating an incentive for people in the highest mortality
risk to buy more life insurance. See id. But see Hudson et al., supra note 89, at 391 (discuss-
ing the costs of medical treatment for genetic diseases to be absorbed under the current
health insurance system of shared risk and shared costs). Hudson states: "our understand-
ing of the relation between a misspelling in a gene and future health is still incomplete,
thus limiting the ability of insurers to incorporate genetic risks into actuarial calculations
on a large scale." Hudson et al., supra note 89, at 391.
105. Rothenberg, supra note 53, at 113.
106. 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12-101 to 12-213 (1997)); see also 2
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 902, Order 915.002,
90245 (1995).
107. See Lori Andrews, As Medical Research Unlocks the Secrets of Genetics, the Battle Over Who
Can Have Access to Your Personal Life Story is Just Getting Under Way in Courts and Legislatures,
83 A.B.A.J. 44, 47 (1997).
108. See id.
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lence is a serious concern that may be in conflict with a health care
provider's duty to warn for genetic diseases. In the context of HIV,
mandated disclosure is a serious concern for HIV infected individuals,
particularly women, because they may be subject to retaliatory vio-
lence from their partner(s).10 9 Indeed, scholars have recognized the
"special" problems with HIV partner notification.' 10 For example, a
study in Nairobi, Kenya evaluated some of the effects on pregnant wo-
men being told they were HIV positive. 1 Counseling provided by a
trained counselor after a positive test result included informing the
partners of the HIV infected patient.'1 2 Twenty-seven percent of the
women in the study communicated their positive test result to their
partner.' 13 Approximately six percent of those women experienced
physical violence from their partner after they disclosed their HIV sta-
tus. 114 The researchers concluded that individuals have a right not to
know test results and that partner notification of HIV status may di-
rectly lead to an episode of violence. 15
Physical violence due to HIV disclosure has also been docu-
mented in the United States.1 6 A survey of 136 health care providers
in Baltimore, Maryland, showed that twenty-four percent of providers
had at least one female patient who experienced physical violence fol-
lowing disclosure of her HIV status to a partner.1 1 7 Moreover, thirty-
seven percent of providers had at least one female patient who exper-
ienced emotional abuse and abandonment following HIV
disclosure.
1 8
109. See, e.g., Vivian B. Brown et al., Mandatory Partner Notification of HIV Test Results:
Psychological and Social Issues for Women, 9 AIDS & PuB. POL'YJ. 86, 86 (1994).
110. Id. at 86-92.
111. See Temmerman, supra note 63, at 969.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. Specifically, eleven women were chased away from their house or replaced
by another wife, seven were beaten up, and one committed suicide. See id. The six percent
violence rate may be underestimated because the researchers were unable to follow up
with all of the women in the study, and the data reflected only spontaneous reports by
women or their relatives. See id. at 970. Alarmed by the physical violence against women as
a consequence of disclosure, the study changed its protocol. See id.
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., Karen H. Rothenberg et al., Domestic Violence and Partner Notification: Impli-
cations for Treatment and Counseling of Women with HIV, 50 JAMA 87 (1995).
117. See id. at 89.
118. See id. Examples of emotional abuse range from "partners spitting on patients to
threats of violence and death against both women and their children .... Patients [are]
commonly rejected, ostracized, and abandoned by family, friends, and partners. One wo-
man returned home to find her belongings in the street, while others lost access to their
children." Karen H. Rothenberg & Stephen J. Paskey, The Risk of Domestic Violence and Wo-
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Although the data for genetic testing disclosure is not as abun-
dant as that for HIV disclosure, a few studies indicate that disclosure
of genetic testing results may lead to similar abandonment." 9 After
premarital sickle cell anemia testing, seven percent of non-carriers
avoided marrying a carrier and some broke off their engagement
upon learning that their potential spouse was a carrier.1 2 ° Similarly,
nine percent of pregnant women surveyed felt that carriers of cystic
fibrosis should avoid marriage. 2 In another study of carriers of Tay-
Sachs disease, men were found to be more likely than women to say
they would change their marriage plans if they learned their fiancee
was also a carrier of Tay-Sachs.' 2
2
It may also be inferred that the disclosure of genetic test results
could lead to physical violence and/or emotional abuse. A woman
may believe that the father of the fetus will blame her if something
goes wrong with the pregnancy. 1 23 In addition, genetic testing in-
creases stress, which, coupled with blame, may lead to domestic vio-
lence.' 2 4 While it is not suggested that the disclosure of genetic
testing results will cause domestic violence, in relationships where do-
mestic violence is already present, the mandatory disclosure of genetic
test results may lead to negative consequences not previously envi-
sioned by any court.
V. CONCLUsION
In contrast to contagious diseases or violent behavior, a patient
with a genetic defect does not pose a risk to family members or other
men with HIV Infection: Implications for Partner Notification, Public Policy, and the Law, 85 AM. J.
PUBLIC HEALTH 1569, 1570 (1995).
119. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 979 n.55; see also George Stamatoyannopoulos,
Problems of Screening and Counseling in the Hemoglobinopathies, in BIRTH DEFECTS:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 268 (Arno G. Motulsky & Widu-
kind Lenz eds., 1974.);Jeffrey R. Botkin & Sonia Alemagno, Carrier Screening for Cystic Fibro-
sis: A Pilot Study of the Attitudes of Pregnant Women, 82 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 723 (1992); Susan
Zeesman et al., A Private View of Hetrozygosity: Eight Year Follow-Up Study on Carriers of the Tay-
Sachs Gene Detected by High School Screening in Montreal 18 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 769 (1984).
120. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 979 (citing Stamatoyannopoulos, supra note 119).
121. See id. (citing Botkin & Alemagno, supra note 119).
122. See id. (citing Zeesman et al., supra note 119). Ninety-five percent of female carriers
of the Tay-Sachs trait responded that they would not alter marriage plans upon discovering
that their fiancee was also a carrier; however, only sixty-nine percent of male carriers re-
sponded they would not change marriage plans if their fiancee was also a carrier. See Zees-
man et al., supra note 119, at 773.
123. See Gates, supra note 72, at 192.
124. Five couples in a study of nineteen couples who participated in predictive testing
for Huntington's disease reported higher levels of marital stress twelve months after receiv-
ing the test results. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 979.
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members of society.125 Family members "have no risk of becoming
carriers; they only have the risk of finding out that they are carriers. '"126
Carriers of disease genes present no foreseeable harm to society, un-
like violent or contagious people. 127
The Safer court has imposed a duty on physicians to warn family
members known to be at risk of potential harm from a genetic disease
without considering the practicalities such a holding imposes or other
negative consequences such disclosures may cause. In some instances,
there are numerous, serious negative consequences that may arise as a
result of mandated disclosure. Until more is known about the risks of
genetic disclosure, 128 other jurisdictions should not adopt Safer's hold-
ing.' 29 In determining whether to inform family members of their
risk of genetic disease, physicians should be able to rely on the courts
to consider numerous factors rather than impose liability based on the
scanty amount of case law.
130
Physicians not only have a duty of confidentiality to their patients,
but should also consider the likelihood the disease will actually mani-
fest itself in a particular patient, whether there is treatment available
for the genetic disease, the reasons a patient may not want to disclose
information (i.e., for fear of discrimination, or possible domestic vio-
lence), and whether family members at risk are minor children.
Courts should consider these practicalities before imposing a duty on
physicians. Because the negative consequences of disclosing to family
members may be as devastating as not disclosing, the Safer Court
should re-evaluate its broad holding to consider all of the potential
consequences of disclosure.
ANGELA LiANG*
125. See Suter, supra note 23, at 1883; see also Underwood & Cadle, supra note 64, at 683.
126. Suter, supra note 23, at 1881 (emphasis added).
127. See id. at 1883-86 (contrasting genetics with AIDS because an HIV-infected individ-
ual puts his sex or needle sharing partners at an unreasonable risk of harm if he or she
engages in behavior that can transmit the virus).
128. See Rothenberg, supra note 53, at 125 (concluding that "until we have a better un-
derstanding of the benefits and risks of genetic testing,.., we must strive to resist a genetic
'quick fix' mentality that promotes genetic testing...").
129. Or, if other jurisdictions do adopt a duty to warn, they should adopt it in the nar-
row circumstance where the genetic disease is treatable. See supra notes 54-62 and accom-
panying text.
130. See Suter, supra note 23, at 1906. Suter concludes that legislatures or courts should
not mandate genetic disclosure to high-risk relatives unless they consider numerous factors
including the significance of the risk, the severity of the potential harm, social stigma, and
the patient's reasons for failing to disclose. See id.
* The author would like to thank professor Karen Rotherberg for all her insights and
support.
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